Impact of Political Families

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# Impact of Political Families
## Economic and Political Consequences

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# Outline
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**Economic consequences**
- MPLADS
- PMGSY
- NREGA
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**Political Consequnces**
- Turnout
- Margin

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## Economic consequences

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##MPLADS

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### Variables of interest
- Days to sanction

- Cost sanctioned

- Type of the projects
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### Available datasets

Replication data from
- Bohlken, Anjali Thomas, 2018, “Targeting Ordinary Voters or Political Elites? Why Pork Is Distributed Along Partisan Lines in India.”

- Velasco Rivera, Carlos, 2019, "Replication Data for: Loyalty or Incentives? How party alignment affects bureaucratic performance"
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### UP

**MPLADS Carlos**

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**MPLADS Bohlekn**

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### India

**MPLADS Carlos**

- In UP, we observed that Family politicians get delayed sanctions, but when we looked at India, we see the exact opposite.

- We ran models for Both UP and India keeping the `Number of weeks for approval` as the outcome variable. However, in both cases the family dummy variable turned out to be **insignificant** as the model became more rigorous
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# PMGSY

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### Variables of interest

- Sanctioned cost

- Number of roads built

- Road length
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### Available datasets

- Data source?
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## UP

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PMGSY 2012 summary

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Outcome variable: Number of roads built in a constituency 
<img src="impact/pmgsy_nroads.png" width="60%" />
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## PMGSY contd.
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Outcome variable:: Length of the road built
<img src="impact/pmgsy_road_length.png" width="100%" />

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Outcome variable: Cost sanctioned for the road

<img src="impact/pmgsy_cost.png" width="100%" />
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