Original Publish Date: 18 May, 2020
Updated on: 03:08 PM – 06 August, 2021
This is a refined version of the old models
page. In this page we have only included regression on the UP data specifically focusing on the formation of political family. We explore the question of who gets to form a political family on using a few different data sets for different years. This has been done for variety of reasons.
To ensure that our significant variables stays significant in different time settings.
One of the caveats of our dynasty data is that, many of the variables are static and collected as recent as 2017 whereas our dynasty data goes back to 1970s. So, technically we are using their latest data point even to asses the possibility of family formation that might have happened long before that. We provide a solution to this by a few models that are limited to the post delimitation years using dynamic data provided by ADR.
In this model we consider winners and runner-ups in the elections held between 197x to 2019 in Uttar Pradesh.
\[{Political \ family} = \alpha +\beta_{1}Minister + \beta_{2} Economic \ diversification + \beta_{3}Land \ ownership + \\ \beta_{3} Election \ won \ by \ first\ member + \beta_{3}Female \ first member + Z + \epsilon \]
Where the outcome of interest \({Political \ family}\) is a dummy variable that is 1 if the family have been successful in forming a political family and 0 otherwise; \(beta_{1}Minister\) is another dummy variable that is 1 if there was at least one minister from that family in the state cabinet; \(\beta_{2} Economic \ diversification\) represents the number of industries and educational institutions owned by that particular family; \(\beta_{3}Land \ ownership\) is continuous variable that denotes the land owned by a family; \(\beta_{3} Election \ won \ by \ first\ member\) is continuous variable that is the number of elections won by the first member of the family; \(\beta_{3} Election \ won \ by \ first\ member\) is dummy variable that is one if the first member of the family was a female 0 otherwise; \({Z}\) is the constituency and candidate level controls; \({\epsilon }\) is the error term clustered at the constituency level
Measure | Family | Minister(Dummy) | Economic diversification | Land ownership (quartiles) | Elections won by first family member | Female first member |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Length | 4867.00 | 4867.0 | 4867.00 | 4867.00 | 4867.00 | 4867.00 |
Unique-N | 2.00 | 2.0 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 11.00 | 2.00 |
Mean | 0.07 | 0.1 | 0.77 | 2.11 | 1.04 | 0.05 |
SD | 0.25 | 0.3 | 1.02 | 1.20 | 1.29 | 0.23 |
Min | 0.00 | 0.0 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Max | 1.00 | 1.0 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 10.00 | 1.00 |
Dependent variable: | ||||
Political Family | ||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Political Diversification (only cabinet) |
0.126*** | 0.126*** | 0.127*** | 0.127*** |
(0.019) | (0.018) | (0.019) | (0.018) | |
Economic diversification | 0.045*** | 0.036*** | 0.044*** | 0.035*** |
(0.007) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.006) | |
Land ownership | 0.023*** | 0.015*** | 0.024*** | 0.016*** |
(0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | |
Elections won by first member | 0.003 | 0.0003 | 0.003 | 0.0001 |
(0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | |
First member - female | -0.022* | -0.036*** | -0.023* | -0.038*** |
(0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | |
Fixed effects | Decade | Sub-region | Deacde and Sub-region | |
Clustered SE | PC | PC | PC | PC |
Caste control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 4,867 | 4,867 | 4,867 | 4,867 |
R2 | 0.121 | 0.148 | 0.123 | 0.150 |
Adjusted R2 | 0.119 | 0.146 | 0.120 | 0.147 |
Residual Std. Error | 0.233 (df = 4856) | 0.230 (df = 4853) | 0.233 (df = 4849) | 0.230 (df = 4846) |
Note: | p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 |
This model is run only among entities who have at least one an election.
Dependent variable: | ||||
Political Family | ||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Political Diversification (only cabinet) |
0.124*** | 0.123*** | 0.125*** | 0.125*** |
(0.020) | (0.018) | (0.020) | (0.019) | |
Economic diversification | 0.056*** | 0.043*** | 0.054*** | 0.042*** |
(0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | |
Land ownership | -0.015** | -0.021*** | -0.015** | -0.021*** |
(0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | |
Elections won by first member | -0.034* | -0.049** | -0.035* | -0.051*** |
(0.019) | (0.020) | (0.019) | (0.020) | |
First member - female | 0.031*** | 0.022*** | 0.033*** | 0.023*** |
(0.007) | (0.007) | (0.006) | (0.006) | |
Fixed effects | Decade | Sub-region | Deacde and Sub-region | |
Clustered SE | PC | PC | PC | PC |
Caste control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 2,943 | 2,943 | 2,943 | 2,943 |
R2 | 0.119 | 0.164 | 0.123 | 0.168 |
Adjusted R2 | 0.116 | 0.160 | 0.118 | 0.162 |
Residual Std. Error | 0.288 (df = 2932) | 0.281 (df = 2929) | 0.288 (df = 2925) | 0.280 (df = 2922) |
Note: | p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 |
This is run among the elections that happened post delimitation, limited to winner and the runner-up
This regression run amongst all the contestants in the general elections held during 2009:19 period.
Measure | Family | Minister dummy | Economic diversification | Land ownership(quartiles) | Elections won by first member | First member female | Total assets (in millions) | Serious crime | Turncoat | Incumbent |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Length | 2092.00 | 2092.0 | 2092.00 | 2092.00 | 2092.00 | 2092.00 | 2092.00 | 2092.00 | 2092.00 | 2092.00 |
Unique-N | 2.00 | 2.0 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 8.00 | 2.00 | 2017.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
Mean | 0.23 | 0.2 | 1.49 | 2.94 | 0.17 | 0.07 | 50.61 | 0.26 | 0.12 | 0.23 |
SD | 0.42 | 0.4 | 1.13 | 1.11 | 0.70 | 0.26 | 87.37 | 0.44 | 0.33 | 0.42 |
Min | 0.00 | 0.0 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Max | 1.00 | 1.0 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 8.00 | 1.00 | 561.97 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
Dependent variable: | ||||
Political Family | ||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Total assets (log) | 0.045*** | 0.043*** | 0.045*** | 0.045*** |
(0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | |
Serious crime | -0.034 | -0.044* | -0.035 | -0.044* |
(0.024) | (0.023) | (0.024) | (0.023) | |
Turncoat | 0.033 | 0.036 | 0.030 | 0.031 |
(0.031) | (0.031) | (0.030) | (0.030) | |
Fixed effects | Year | Sub-region | Year and Sub-region | |
Clustered SE | PC | PC | PC | PC |
Caste control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 2,059 | 2,059 | 2,059 | 2,059 |
R2 | 0.052 | 0.062 | 0.066 | 0.074 |
Adjusted R2 | 0.048 | 0.057 | 0.059 | 0.065 |
Residual Std. Error | 0.412 (df = 2050) | 0.410 (df = 2046) | 0.409 (df = 2043) | 0.408 (df = 2039) |
Note: | p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 |
This model is run among the contestants who have won at lease one election in their political career
Dependent variable: | ||||
Political Family | ||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Minister | 0.047*** | 0.047*** | 0.047*** | 0.047*** |
(0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | |
Economic diversification | -0.034 | -0.034 | -0.034 | -0.034 |
(0.028) | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.028) | |
Land ownership | 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.016 |
(0.034) | (0.034) | (0.034) | (0.034) | |
Fixed effects | Year | Sub-region | Year and Sub-region | |
Clustered SE | PC | PC | PC | PC |
Caste control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 1,641 | 1,641 | 1,641 | 1,641 |
R2 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 | 0.071 |
Adjusted R2 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 | 0.063 |
Residual Std. Error (df = 1625) | 0.438 | 0.438 | 0.438 | 0.438 |
Note: | p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 |
Var1 | Freq |
---|---|
2009 | 163 |
2012 | 1613 |
2014 | 279 |
2017 | 1296 |
2019 | 190 |
dynast | turncoat | recontest | incumbent |
---|---|---|---|
0.25 | 0.12 | 0.35 | 0.17 |
Dependent variable: | ||||
Political Family | ||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
log(assets) | 0.043*** | 0.046*** | 0.044*** | 0.047*** |
(0.006) | (0.007) | (0.006) | (0.007) | |
serious_crime | 0.019 | 0.015 | 0.019 | 0.015 |
(0.020) | (0.020) | (0.019) | (0.019) | |
turncoat | 0.022 | 0.023 | 0.021 | 0.022 |
(0.025) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.025) | |
Fixed effects | Year | Sub-region | Year and Sub-region | |
Clustered SE | PC | PC | PC | PC |
Caste control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 2,909 | 2,909 | 2,909 | 2,909 |
R2 | 0.031 | 0.033 | 0.038 | 0.039 |
Adjusted R2 | 0.029 | 0.030 | 0.034 | 0.035 |
Residual Std. Error | 0.405 (df = 2901) | 0.405 (df = 2900) | 0.404 (df = 2895) | 0.404 (df = 2894) |
Note: | p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 |